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On February 9, 1871, just over three weeks after the new German Empire was declared at Versailles, Benjamin Disraeli rose to address the House of Commons. At the 
time Disraeli was the Conservative leader of the opposition, and 
the Liberal Gladstone Ministry had maintained strict neutrality 
during the Franco-Prussian War. Although Disraeli also opposed 
British intervention, he recognized in Prussia’s victory far-reaching 
consequences for the European state system, stating “It is no com-
mon war, like the war between Prussia and Austria, or like the Ital-
ian war in which France was engaged some years ago; nor is it like 
the Crimean War.” Disraeli further pronounced:
!is war represents the German Revolution, a greater political 
event than the French Revolution of last century … !ere is not 
a diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. You have 
a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects 
and dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that ob-
scurity incident to novelty in such affairs…but what has really 
come to pass in Europe? !e balance of power has been entirely 
destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the ef-
fects of this great change most, is England.1
To the modern reader, Disraeli’s speech seems remarkably pre-
scient. As A.J.P. Taylor could reflect in 1954, “Sedan* marked the 
end of an epoch in European history; it was the moment when the 
myth of la grande nation, dominating Europe, was shattered forever. 
!e Balance of Power was startlingly altered.”2 And indeed, not 
only was the myth of French predominance destroyed, but a new 
era of European history, one in which Germany would be the
pivotal power, was born.
* !e Battle of Sedan marked a major turning point in the Franco-Prussian War. 
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But in acknowledging Disraeli’s foresight we ought not as-
sume that either he or any other British statesman was confident 
that the newly unified Germany would be a menace to England, 
much less that British diplomacy should aim to counterbalance the 
fledgling central European empire. It was only after a long series of 
disturbing German actions, culminating in the “war-in-sight” crisis 
of 1875, that the British fully came to view the “German Revolu-
tion” as hurtful to their interests.3 In fact, for decades educated 
English opinion had favored the emergence of a unified German 
state, and from the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War British 
sympathies tended toward the Prussian side. It is not difficult to see 
why such sentiments prevailed. Reared in the tradition of Britain 
as a world power, British statesmen of the era were more concerned 
with Russian advances into Central Asia and French designs in 
the Mediterranean than alterations in the continental balance of 
power. Moreover, a strong and united Germany, situated between 
Russia and France, would distract England’s two great rivals and 
deter them from extra-European adventures.4 In the middle of the 
nineteenth century, Lord Palmerston became the chief British pro-
ponent of German unity, believing that Britain and the German 
states faced common threats in Russia and France. “England and 
Germany therefore,” Palmerston avowed, “have mutually a direct 
interest in assisting each other to become rich, united and strong.”5
"us, from a geopolitical standpoint, a long British tradition 
supported the idea of a strong and unified Germany in the center 
of Europe. But British sympathy for the cause of German unifica-
tion was not merely rooted in calculations of geopolitics; rather it 
extended to the realms of culture, religion, and ideology. "e land 
of Kant, Goethe, and Schiller, Germany was home to an illustri-
ous intellectual tradition very fashionable in nineteenth-century 
England, and Prussia, the largest German kingdom, was the only 
European great power that shared Britain’s Protestant religious 
heritage. "roughout the nineteenth century British intellectuals 
such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Matthew Arnold, George Eliot, 
John Stuart Mill, and "omas Carlyle had propagated the image of 
Germans as “noble, intelligent, peaceful, civilized, and profoundly 
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religious people.”6 Furthermore, by the 1860s, the doctrine of na-
tionalism had become part and parcel of British liberalism,  and the 
British had already enthusiastically advocated Greek and Italian 
unity.7 A Germany unified under Prussian auspices, British states-
men believed, would be liberal, peace-loving, and England’s “natural 
ally” on the continent.8
One such statesman was Robert Morier, who became Brit-
ish secretary at Darmstadt just after the Austro-Prussian War of 
1866.9 He followed the war with great interest, but as a liberal and 
a proud Germanophile, he was disturbed that Bismarck, whom he 
called “one of the most sinister figures that has ever been painted 
on the canvas of history,” had co-opted the cause of German uni-
ty.10 Indeed, most British intellectuals and statesmen, despite their 
positive feelings for the German people, considered Bismarck re-
actionary and tyrannical. Nevertheless, steeped as they were in the 
“Whig interpretation” of history, these same Englishmen assumed 
that Bismarck, like so many other “enemies of progress” before him, 
would eventually be cast into the dust heap of history.* “When any 
institutions come directly into contact with the spirit of the time,” 
wrote Liberal politician Mountstuart Grant Duff, “they may re-
sist for five years, or ten, or twenty, but down they must go in the 
end.”11 "us Bismarck did not substantially alter English opinion 
on German unification.
"e British Foreign Office welcomed Prussia’s victory over 
Austria.12 Although Morier and other English liberals had hoped 
that Austria would be expelled from Germany and Italy by “the 
natural course of events,” they were nonetheless pleased to see “the 
congenital malformation of Europe” remedied.† Bismarck’s choice 
of means for effecting unification were reprehensible, but both the 
* See Herbert Butterfield, !e Whig Interpretation of History (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1965), p. 5: “[T]he historian tends in the first place to adopt the whig or Protestant view of the 
subject,” writes Butterfield, “and very quickly busies himself with dividing the world into the 
friends and enemies of progress.”
† "e “natural course of events” refers to “the ripening of political history in Prussia.” Violent 
war against Austria was considered unnatural—the product of Bismarck’s ideas alone. Robert 
Morier to M. Grant-Duff ( June 9, 1866). Rosslyn Wemyss, ed., Memoirs and Letters of the 
Right Hon. Sir Robert Morier, From 1826 to 1876, Vol. II. (London: Edward Arnold, 1911), p. 
66. Italics added.
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national principle and the enlightened Weltanschauung of the Ger-
man people ensured that a unified Germany would foster a more 
peaceful European order. Hence Morier could write to his father, “I 
entirely concur in your wish to see Bismarck hung,” and neverthe-
less support the Prussian minister’s war against Austria.*
Despite British inclinations toward Prussia and the cause of 
German unification in the 1860s, these sentiments never translat-
ed into action. British foreign policy toward Europe was decidedly 
non-interventionist during the decade of Bismarck’s wars.13 Most 
historians agree that the first Gladstone Ministry, which came to 
power in late 1868, was one of the most inward-looking in the an-
nals of Victorian Britain.† And fortunately—at least it seemed—
the international situation was calm and clear. A few months after 
Gladstone entered office, Bismarck wrote him a letter about the 
European situation. “"e political horizon seen from Berlin ap-
pears at present so unclouded that there is nothing to report,” pro-
fessed the Prussian minister.14 Colonel Walker, the British military 
attaché at Berlin, reasoned that the “unification of Germany was far 
distant.”15 Preoccupied with affairs at home, the Gladstone Min-
istry readily accepted such reports. When Lord Granville became 
foreign secretary after Clarendon’s death in June 1870, Edmund 
Hammond, the under-secretary, told him “he had never during his 
long experience known so great a lull in foreign affairs, and that he 
was not aware of any important question that [Granville] should 
have to deal with.”16
Yet, however “unclouded” the horizon appeared, tensions were 
brewing in Europe. Napoleon III, emperor of France since 1852, 
had spent his career championing the nationalist cause throughout 
* Morier believed that “A signal victory on the part of Austria in the present struggle would 
throw Europe back three generations.” Robert Morier to his father ( June 20, 1866). Wemyss, 
Memoirs and Letters of Morier, pp. 67–68.
† Gladstone’s first premiership (December 3, 1868 – February 17, 1874) has gone down 
in history as the “Great Ministry” for its momentous internal reforms. Yet the Gladstone 
Ministry’s preoccupation with domestic policy left little time for international affairs.Raymond 
James Sontag, German and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894 (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1969), p. 80; William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 12; A.A.W. Ramsay, Idealism and Foreign Policy: A Study of the 
Relations of Great Britain with Germany and France, 1860-1878 (London: John Murray, 1925), 
p. 276.
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the continent, and the British, in light of their fixation on Belgian 
neutrality, looked upon him with suspicion. Napoleon welcomed 
Prussia’s rapid victory over Austria in 1866; a Prussian state orga-
nized on a national basis, he assumed, would inevitably be liberal 
and, consequently, estranged from his enemy, Russia.17 But many 
Frenchmen were angry, believing that France must achieve its own 
coup to offset Prussia’s gains. Napoleon thus instructed one of his 
top diplomats, Count Benedetti, to negotiate a secret accord with 
Bismarck. A draft agreement was drawn up in which France would 
ensure the integrity of Prussia’s territorial acquisitions in exchange 
for carte blanche in Luxembourg and Belgium.* However, the so-
called “Benedetti Treaty” was never signed, so Napoleon was forced 
to look elsewhere to satisfy disgruntled French opinion. His next 
interlocutor was the king of Holland, with whom he negotiated the 
annexation of Luxembourg to France. But at the last minute, the 
Dutch king lost his nerve and refused to sign the treaty without 
first informing Prussia. "e result was predictable: a torrent of na-
tionalist feeling in Germany, followed by a conference of the pow-
ers affirming Luxembourg’s neutrality. Although seemingly trifling, 
the Luxembourg Crisis was a major watershed in the diplomatic 
history of Europe. Henceforward it seemed no longer possible for 
France to accept gracefully the emergence of a strong Prussia-Ger-
many on its eastern border.18
With Franco-Prussian relations so bitter, French public opin-
ion calling for revanche for Sadowa,  and constant military prepa-
rations in both France and Prussia, it is astonishing that the Brit-
ish Foreign Office thought the international landscape so placid in 
early summer 1870.†  Less than three weeks after Hammond spoke 
of an unprecedented “lull” in foreign affairs, the issue of the Hohen-
zollern candidature had exploded into a full-fledged Franco–Prus-
* Luxembourg and Belgium were considered natural areas in which Napoleon III might seek to 
augment the French Empire. "at such an agreement could even be proposed indicates how far 
continental perceptions of British power and willfulness had fallen by 1867. A. J. P. Taylor, !e 
Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1954), pp. 173-74. 
† Sadowa (Königgrätz) was the site of Prussia’s major battlefield victory of the Austro-
Prussian War. During Prussia’s next war, against France, Bismarck said to Count Bernstorff: 
“Even our victory at Sadova roused bitterness in France; how much more will our victory over 
themselves.” Quoted in Ibid., p. 217.
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sian war. From the outset of the conflict British opinion across all 
levels of society regarded Napoleon as the aggressor.19 Queen Vic-
toria, always partial for things German over French, was a commit-
ted advocate of the Prussian side. However, despite her sympathies 
and the pleadings of her daughter,  the Crown Princess of Prussia, 
the Queen recognized the necessity of British neutrality.20 “We 
must be neutral as long as we can, but no one here conceals their 
opinion as to the extreme iniquity of the war, and the unjustifiable 
conduct of the French!” wrote the Queen to her daughter, “ … the 
feeling of the people and country here is all with you … And need 
I say what I feel?”21
British liberals were particularly pro-Prussian in their lean-
ings, as the war seemed to them a selfish and aggressive crusade 
by Napoleon against popular German national feeling. One such 
liberal, Gladstone, suspected that the French people might rise 
up against their emperor: “If ever there was a Government-made 
War, it is this: & France may call the author to account.”22 Another, 
Morier, resented the Gladstone Ministry for permitting the con-
tinuation of British arms sales to France.* “France draws the sword 
to assert her political preponderance over Europe. Germany draws 
the sword to assert her national existence. But the result will be 
that the preponderance of Germany over Europe for centuries to 
come will take the place of French preponderance,” opined Morier. 
“We sit by like a bloated Quaker, too holy to fight, but rubbing 
our hands at the roaring trade we are driving in cartridges and am-
munition.”23 To liberals like Morier and indeed most Englishmen, 
Germany represented progress, while Napoleon personified reac-
tion; the German people were fighting for liberty, while the French 
emperor was striving for self-gratification. It is thus understandable 
that Gladstone thought the French people might topple Napoleon, 
and that Morier could censure the British government for selling 
weapons to the French side. Free trade was supposed to be a civiliz-
ing principle, not an excuse for profiting off of Napoleon’s unjust 
war against the German people.
* Morier was concerned that the arms sales were giving Britain a bad name in Germany. Robert 
Morier to his father ( July 31, 1870). Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of Morier, p. 157.
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!e only continental issue that really concerned the Glad-
stone Ministry was Belgian neutrality. When !e Times published 
a leaked copy of the “Benedetti Treaty” on July 25, in which Na-
poleon’s Belgian ambitions were laid bare, British opinion, both 
popular and official, moved decisively against France.24 Meanwhile, 
defying a great portion of British expectations, the Prussian army 
won victory after victory over the French in August. Disraeli rel-
ished in the irony of Napoleon’s fortune: “!is collapse of France 
has all come from the Emperor’s policy of nationality…!e Em-
peror started this hare in order that he might ultimately get Bel-
gium. Belgium is safe and France is smashed!”25 On September 
1, Prussia’s victory became total on the battlefield of Sedan, where 
Napoleon surrendered himself and his entire army the next day. 
!e Second French Empire had been driven out of existence in just 
over a month, and the question of a unified and powerful German 
state in the center of Europe, for all intents and purposes, ceased to 
be one. At least in form, the hopes of Palmerston, Morier, and the 
British liberals had come to fruition.
But less than four years after Sedan, when it seemed that 
Germany and France were again plunging headlong toward war, 
Britain’s response was strikingly different. During the “war-in-
sight” crisis of 1875, it was not only British public opinion that was 
against Germany; the Foreign Office went so far as to intervene to 
stay Bismarck’s hand. How could the British position have changed 
so drastically in such a short period of time? After Sedan the birth 
of a German empire was all but an accomplished fact; the character 
of that new empire, however, remained an open question.
THE BIRTH OF DOUBT: ALSACE-LORRAINE AND THE 
END OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 
Robert Morier, perhaps as accurately as any other English-
man, predicted the course of the Franco-Prussian War. When news 
reached England that the two sides were mobilizing, Morier was at 
a dinner party. !e guests knew Morier to be an expert on German 
issues, so they solicited his opinion on the coming conflict. After 
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denouncing Britain’s failure to prevent the outbreak of war, Morier 
proclaimed: “France and Germany will have to fight it out alone, it 
will be the most horrible war the world has ever seen, and it will 
end by France being thoroughly and completely beaten.”26 !e 
prediction was unorthodox, but subsequent events soon proved 
its wisdom. Morier was also prescient when it came to the subtler 
aspects of the war. As he wrote to his father after the early Prus-
sian victories, “[W]ith one voice the whole [German] nation is de-
manding vengeance, and this demand will, I fear, take the form of 
a demand for French territory, for Alsace–Lorraine, the very worst 
fault the victorious Germany could commit.”27
!e issue of Franco-Prussian peace terms—and particular-
ly the subject of Alsace-Lorraine—would be the hinge on which 
British opinion would turn over the next several months. After 
Napoleon’s surrender at Sedan, the French formed the Govern-
ment of National Defense, which was determined to continue the 
war, and whose foreign minister, Jules Favre, declared proudly that 
France would not cede “an inch of her territory or a stone of her 
fortresses.”28 At this point the war ceased to be, as Gladstone had 
described, “Government-made”; it was a war of nations, and the 
conventions of warfare gave way to brutality and carnage.29
Most Englishmen, who supported Germany’s claim to na-
tional existence and considered the war a Napoleonic invention, 
naturally assumed the fighting would stop after the French em-
peror was removed. Considering Napoleon a threat to the peace 
of Europe, and thinking that French mores had become indulgent 
and base, the British hoped Sedan would be an edifying moment 
for France.30 On the other hand, the “noble” German victors were 
expected to reach equitable peace terms and begin their reign as a 
rock of stability in Europe. “Such a downfall is a melancholy thing, 
but it is meant to teach deep lessons; may we all learn what frivol-
ity, conceit and immorality lead to!” wrote the Crown Princess a 
few days after Sedan. “It would be grievous for Art’s sake for that 
beautiful capital [Paris] to suffer. I trust it will not come to that.”31
But the war went on, and Paris was laid under siege on Sep-
tember 19, 1870. !ree days later, Bismarck announced in a cir-
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cular telegram Prussia’s intentions to annex territory in Alsace-
Lorraine. While he may have been more concerned with home 
affairs than foreign, Gladstone, like other British liberals, regarded 
the principle of nationality and the sanctity of international trea-
ties and norms as matters of paramount importance; indeed his 
commitment to these issues was as strong as any of his contem-
poraries. "e Prussian circular assailed Gladstone’s dearest creeds. 
Recent European practice had established the principle that ter-
ritorial transfers were not to take place without the consent of the 
inhabitants. Before Savoy and Nice were officially incorporated 
into France in 1860, plebiscites were held so that the populations 
themselves could determine their national destinies.32 After receiv-
ing the Prussian circular, Gladstone voiced concern to Granville: 
“[It] appears to me that Count Bismarck’s paper raises questions of 
public right, in which all Europe has a common interest, and it is 
impossible for us to receive in silence.”33  
Gladstone was stoked into action. He wrote a series of mem-
oranda to his cabinet urging British diplomatic intervention to pre-
vent the annexations, which he surmised would affect 1.25 million 
people. “"e transfer of the allegiance and citizenship … of human 
beings from one sovereignty to another, without any reference to 
their own consent,” ruminated the prime minister in the first memo, 
“has been a great reproach to some former transactions in Europe; 
has led to many wars and disturbances; is hard to reconcile with 
considerations of equity; and is repulsive to the sense of modern 
civilization.”34 Meanwhile, against Granville’s advice, Gladstone 
wrote a lengthy treatise on the subject for the Edinburgh Review.35 
In the article, he proclaimed “a new law of nations [that] is gradually 
taking hold of the mind.” "is “law” recognized the right of national 
self-determination, commanded the peaceful and permanent reso-
lution of conflicts, and declared “the general judgment of civilised 
mankind” as the “tribunal of paramount authority.”36 Napoleon’s 
aggression had violated the law, and for this he was justly censured. 
If Germany proceeded to transgress by annexing Alsace-Lorraine 
against the will of the inhabitants, it too should expect reproach.* 
* As Gladstone wrote of his “law” of nations: “It has censured the aggression of France; it will 
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Although the article was published anonymously, the identity of its 
author was never a mystery to the British public. Within the cabi-
net Granville led opposition against Gladstone’s plan for interven-
tion, asserting that it would only damage British prestige to stand 
up for general principles with neither the will nor the power to give 
them force.37 Yet Gladstone, repulsed by the idea of transferring 
“human beings like chattels,” refused to concede defeat.38 
In Prussia there were also voices opposing the annexations, 
but they were few and severely outmatched. One such dissenter 
was Johann Jacoby, a Prussian-Jewish politician, who organized a 
public outcry. Jacoby and his counterparts were hastily imprisoned 
in September, shocking British liberals who tended to idealize their 
German “cousins.”39 Queen Victoria was forced to reexamine her 
own views when her friend, Queen Augusta of Prussia, wrote her 
a letter voicing misgivings about the prospective peace terms. “!e 
boundary line of language should in particular be maintained, and 
no really French territory be claimed,” expressed Augusta, “… we 
must ever pray for an honourable and blessed peace!”40 Such senti-
ments, however, were drowned out by the mass of German opinion 
across the political spectrum demanding reward for the heroism of 
the fallen. Even the Crown Prince Frederick, whose liberal creden-
tials were well established in England, could write in his personal 
diary, “!e annexation of Alsace and perhaps of a part of Lorraine, 
is surely well earned by the sacrifices Germany has made.”41
Disturbed by the volume of German opinion favoring annex-
ation, and defeated in his hopes of intervention by his own cabinet, 
Gladstone sought to inject his voice into the discussion through 
private channels. !e renowned German liberal intellectual Fried-
rich Max Müller, then professor of philology at Oxford, was both 
a correspondent of Gladstone’s and a friend of Bismarck’s personal 
secretary, Heinrich Abeken. Assuming that Müller was of the same 
mind, Gladstone sent him a letter: “I want to ask you what we are 
to think of the Alsace and L[orraine] question,” wrote the prime 
minister. “It would surprise me to find that you thought these peo-
ple [could] properly be annexed to Germany, if their heart is in 
censure, if need arise, the greed of Germany.” Ibid.
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France.”42 But Gladstone was surprised when Müller responded 
with an ardent defense of the case for annexation: “!e thousands 
and thousands of German hearts that lie buried in Alsace-Lorraine 
have made that soil German once more.”43 Müller’s letter revealed 
that German liberals could not see eye-to-eye with those of Britain 
on the Alsace–Lorraine question, and it perhaps reflected deeper 
differences in the characteristics of liberalism in the two countries. 
“Max Müller’s letter … shows the hardness of the rock we have to 
melt or break,” wrote Granville to his disappointed chief.44
As the French maintained their resistance and the Prus-
sians were determined to march on Paris, many Englishmen be-
gan to have doubts about the forces that the Prussian victory had 
unleashed. “[O]ur sympathies were entirely with the Germans in 
the beginning of the war,” wrote George Eliot on September 26, 
“but I cannot help admitting to myself now, that if they had been 
in a higher moral condition—I mean the whole [German] nation 
and its government—the war might not have reached this hideous 
stage.”45 !omas Carlyle was so frustrated by the haste with which 
British sympathies were turning against Prussia that he published 
a letter in !e Times on November 18, defending the German 
cause.46 More representative of popular opinion, however, was the 
editor’s note printed alongside the letter, denouncing Carlyle for 
“treating provinces as chattels, and their inhabitants as vermin that 
may incidentally swarm about them.”47
By the time of Carlyle’s letter, it had become evident that Prus-
sia’s victory would have far-reaching consequences—and not all of 
them for the better. As France lay prostrate, the other European 
powers gathered like vultures, seeking to profit from the vacuum. 
On September 20, Italian forces occupied Rome, eviscerating the 
temporal power of the pope while his protector, France, was immo-
bilized. More troubling to England was the Russian circular of Oc-
tober 31, declaring the czar’s intention to renounce unilaterally the 
Black Sea clauses of the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Consummated after 
the Crimean War, the clauses prohibited Russia from commanding 
a fleet in the Black Sea. Gladstone and other British liberals had 
opposed the clauses from the first, but the idea that a European 
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power could unilaterally free itself from treaty obligations flew in 
the face of the prime minister’s core principles. “It is quite evident 
that the effect of such doctrine … is to bring the entire authority 
and efficacy of all Treaties under the discretionary control of each 
one of the Powers who may have signed them,” wrote Gladstone 
following the Russian announcement, “#at is to say the result ob-
tained is the entire denunciation of Treaties in their essence.”48
With Prussia’s resolve to annex Alsace-Lorraine, Italy’s force-
ful takeover of Rome, and Russia’s intention to shred the Black Sea 
clauses, it seemed Prussia’s victory at Sedan had rendered fragile 
the whole system of international law. But Gladstone was deter-
mined not to let it be torn asunder. #e prime minister dispatched 
Odo Russell, England’s former representative at the Vatican, to 
the German headquarters in France to discuss the Black Sea is-
sue.* Meeting with Bismarck, Russell exceeded his instructions and 
proclaimed that Britain would go to war, “with or without allies,” 
if the Russians refused to disavow their unilateral renunciation.49 
Bismarck had no time to contemplate a potential conflict in the 
east while war against France still raged; he thus consented to call a 
conference of the powers, which was held in London in early 1871. 
At the end of negotiations the Black Sea clauses were revoked, but 
the parties declared it an “essential principle of the law of nations 
that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, 
nor modify stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the con-
tracting Powers by means of an amicable agreement.”50 Gladstone 
had triumphed and the sanctity of international treaties was saved.
But in Gladstone’s other great cause—applying the principle 
of national self-determination in Alsace-Lorraine—success was 
beyond his reach. In the beginning of January 1871 the German 
forces prepared to bombard Paris. By this point the British public 
had swung decisively in favor of France, and the Germans were tak-
ing notice. “#at we Germans are losing hold of sympathy in Eng-
land I have observed for a long time with grief,” wrote the Crown 
* It was clear from the outset that Bismarck had agreed to support Russia’s claim in exchange 
for the czar's good will toward Prussian aggrandizement. Eyck Erich, Bismarck and the German 
Empire (New York: W.W. Norton, 1964), p. 190; Langer, European Alliances, p. 11.
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Prince Frederick to Queen Victoria, “and this will go on increas-
ingly till Paris falls.”51 Even Morier had doubts. “Germany is to be 
held accursed. 1. Because she has not yet made peace. 2. Because 
she insists on a territorial concession. 3. Because her manner of 
conducting the war is unworthy of a civilised nation,” wrote Morier, 
describing the current feeling of the British public. And Morier, 
perhaps in spite of himself, found reasons to agree with these sen-
timents. On one occasion his disappointment reached such levels 
that he fumed to his close friend, Ernst von Stockmar, that “the 
lust for gloire, kindled as it is within her [Germany], will burn with 
a much more terrible fierceness than it ever did in the grande na-
tion.”52 Stockmar was shocked by his friend’s words and asked for 
an explanation.53 A few weeks later, after the German Empire was 
declared at Versailles, Morier responded in a more equable frame 
of mind:
What I meant to imply was that such unparalleled successes as 
those which have attended the German arms, and the conse-
quent absolute power which the German nation has acquired 
over Europe, will tend especially to modify the German national 
character, and that not only necessarily for the better … Is it love 
of exaggeration to fear that under such circumstances the Ger-
man Empire based on universal suffrage, i.e., on the suffrages of 
the 800,000 men who have been fighting in France … may have 
some of the faults of militarism attaching to it?54
Morier had advocated for the form of German unity for decades, 
but at the moment of creation he was worried about the substance 
of the Germany that had come into existence. Would a united Ger-
many, drunk on the triumphs of blood and iron, bear the emblem 
of Bismarck, its illiberal architect? Could Morier really feel con-
fident that Bismarck’s influence would be fleeting, and that after 
his inevitable downfall Germany would blossom into a paragon of 
liberalism?
Morier was not alone in his concerns. "e British public 
was rife with fears that England would be Germany’s next victim. 
George Tomkyns Chesney’s novella, !e Battle of Dorking, pub-
lished in serialized form beginning in early 1871, did much to fuel 
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dread. Quickly an international sensation, !e Battle of Dorking is 
told from the perspective of an old Englishman, who narrates the 
story of his past to his grandchildren. “!e danger did not come 
on us unawares,” the old man reflects, “… We English have only 
ourselves to blame for the humiliation which has been brought on 
the land.”55 He then proceeds to recount how a few years after the 
Franco-Prussian War, Germany conquered England and destroyed 
the British Empire. Similarly popular was Henry Pullen’s !e Fight 
at Dame Europa’s School, which tells the story of three young stu-
dents—Johnnie, Louis, and William—who symbolize England, 
France, and Germany, respectively. !ough William was “the big-
gest and strongest” and coveted Louis’ flowerbeds, he was a “very 
studious and peaceable boy, and made the rest of the school believe 
he had never provoked a quarrel in his life.”56 When the rest of the 
school least expects it, William tramples over Louis’ flowerbeds and 
annexes them. Dame Europa soon learns of the story and excori-
ates Johnnie for his spineless neutrality, advising him to “Take care 
that William, the peaceable, unaggressive Boy, does not contrive (as I 
fully believe he will contrive) to get a footing on the river, where he 
can keep a boat, and then one fine morning take your pretty island 
by surprise.”57 By the end of February 1871, !e Fight at Dame 
Europa’s School had sold two hundred thousand copies.58
Among British intellectuals and statesmen, concerns were 
concentrated on what the birth of Bismarckian Germany meant 
for the European state system, rather than expectations of future 
Anglo-German conflict. Far from the old idea that a united Germa-
ny would foster continental peace, Gladstone worried that German 
unification might signal “the beginning of a new series of European 
complications.”59 !e jurist-historian Frederic Harrison, who had 
initially supported Germany against Napoleon, wrote in !e Fort-
nightly Review that Europe faced “essentially a moral struggle; one 
of principles.”60 Despite hopes for a liberal Germany, “Bismarck-
ism,” as Harrison called it, would provide an ideological challenge 
to British ideas of international morality. “Europe is thrown into 
the cauldron to be re-cast, and a new Holy Alliance is forming on 
the principle of ‘Blood and Iron’ which England must meet abso-
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lutely alone,” Harrison cautioned.61 Prussia was the most militaris-
tic state in the world, and the German people had so thoroughly 
surrendered their will to Bismarck that there was now more civic 
participation in czarist Russia. As Harrison asked, “We are told 
to trust to Germany at the close of her victory assuming a liberal 
form. What are the grounds for such hope?”62 
Harrison found such hopes groundless, but other educated 
Englishmen remained guardedly optimistic. Certainly when Bis-
marck presented his peace terms to France in February 1871—
which included the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine—the British 
Foreign Office had no thoughts of counterbalancing nascent Ger-
man power.* Britain needed a larger body of evidence before it 
could conclude that Germany must be bridled.
THE PERIOD OF DISILLUSIONMENT, 1871–1874
Bismarck’s boundless imagination was both his blessing and 
his curse. On the one hand, it provided him with broad freedom 
to seek diplomatic combinations, and enabled him to prepare for 
contingencies that other statesmen could not foresee. But on the 
other hand, it filled him with constant anxiety; he was keenly aware 
of the fragility of his position, of how a rapid twist of fate could give 
rise to his cauchemar des coalitions. In his memoirs Bismarck reveals 
that fears of potential neutral-power intervention in the Franco–
Prussian War “troubled me night and day,” and doubtless his dip-
lomatic counterparts were unsettled by his excitability.63 When 
Odo Russell visited German headquarters in France in late 1870, 
Bismarck received the British emissary warmly, assuring him that 
“After the present war Germany would care for nothing but peace.”† 
* "e French signed a preliminary peace on February 26, and the formal Treaty of Frankfurt 
was signed on May 10. "e terms included the annexation of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine 
to the German Empire; a French indemnity of five-milliard francs; and German occupation of 
parts of France until the reparations were paid in full. Taylor, Struggle, p. 217; A.A.W. Ramsay, 
Idealism and Foreign Policy: A Study of the Relations of Great Britain with Germany and France, 
1860-1878 (London: John Murray, 1925), p. 347; Paul Knaplund, Gladstone’s Foreign Policy 
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1970), p. 62.
† Bismarck also told Russell that “England and Austria are the natural Allies of Germany.” Odo 
Russell to Granville (December 18, 1870). Paul Knaplund, ed., Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 
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Despite the Prussian minister’s good graces, Russell found reasons 
to be suspicious. “Now that I know him,” reported Russell, “I shall 
no longer be surprised to see him change the Map of Europe far 
more than the Emperor Napoleon was expected to do and we must 
be prepared for many disagreeable surprises.”64
In the wake of the war, Bismarck’s anxieties were focused on 
two closely related issues: one external, the other internal. First and 
foremost, the new German chancellor feared that the French and 
the Austrians, who had both succumbed to the Prussian sword, 
would recover their strength and join forces against Germany in a 
war of revenge.65 Second, Bismarck worried about the unity of the 
fledgling German Empire. A number of constituencies within the 
empire—notably the Bavarians, the Alsatians, the Lorrainers, and 
the Poles—were thought to be of questionable loyalty, and owing 
to their Catholic faith, they represented a potential fifth column 
in the event of a Franco-Austrian war against Germany. As a re-
sult, Bismarck initially pursued a two-fold policy: the prevention of 
a clericalist party, most likely in the form of a restored monarchy, 
from taking power in France; and conciliation with the Vatican, in 
an effort to win Pope Pius IX’s support and moderate the separatist 
tendencies within the Catholic Center Party, which had formed in 
Germany in December 1870.66
"e second prong of Bismarck’s policy failed immediately. 
When the chancellor reached out his hand,67 the Vatican not 
only spurned his overtures, but the papal secretary of state, Car-
dinal Antonelli, proclaimed the Roman Curia’s solidarity with the 
Center Party.68 Bismarck’s imagination was unleashed. He sensed 
a Franco-clericalist conspiracy against German unity. "e Franco-
Prussian War itself, he reckoned, had sprouted from an agreement 
between the Vatican and France, whose Empress Eugènie was un-
der Jesuitical control.69 Was it mere coincidence that France de-
clared war on Prussia the day after the Vatican decreed papal infal-
libility?70 Bismarck’s anxious tendencies could not help but catch 
the attention of the British. “It is one of the peculiarities of that 
1871-1874, 1880-1885, Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1942, Vol. 2 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 31.
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great man that he is farsighted to a fault,” averred !e Times. “!ere 
is something nervous and fidgety in his otherwise dauntless dispo-
sition, which renders him unable to find rest in the present, and sets 
him scheming and striving about an indefinite future.”71 With such 
an unpredictable helmsman, the German ship of state might sail a 
disruptive course in international affairs. 
Following Antonelli’s rebuff, Bismarck decided to tamp down 
the Catholic Center Party by using more direct methods. When 
the Reichstag first convened in March 1871, the National Liberal 
Party possessed a commanding position.72 As the most enthusi-
astic supporters of German unity, the National Liberals viewed 
Bismarck as a hero and willingly followed his lead. A few months 
after the inaugural meeting, Bismarck commenced what would be-
come known as the Kulturkampf by dissolving the Catholic De-
partment of the Prussian Ministry of Worship. Meanwhile, under 
the leadership of Adolphe !iers, the French were already showing 
signs of rejuvenation. By cleverly forging a handshake agreement in 
the National Assembly—the so-called Pact of Bordeaux—!iers 
was able to revitalize French military and economic strength with 
impressive celerity. Alarmed by France’s recovery, Bismarck moved 
to further defend the German Empire from the potential fifth col-
umn.* While the full extent of Bismarck’s intended war against 
the Catholic Church was not yet known, the British Foreign Of-
fice already noticed signs of renewed Franco-German discord. “!e 
New Year will open gloomily for France. !e Germans appear to 
be alarmed, or at all events irritated, by !iers’s military boasts and 
military preparations,” wrote Lord Lyons, the British ambassador 
to France, in late 1871. “!e Germans mean to have their money 
and keep the territory they have taken, and they say that they had 
better have it out with France now that she is weak, than wait till 
she has got strong again.”73
* In December 1871, Bismarck inserted the Kanzelparagraf (“Pulpit Law”) into the German 
Criminal Code, which made public clerical criticism of the state punishable by imprisonment, 
Francis A. Arlinghaus, “!e Kulturkampf and European Diplomacy, 1871-1875,” !e Catholic 
History Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 (October 1942), p. 347; !e Pact of Bordeaux tabled discussions 
of the eventual form of the French government until essential works of national reconstruction 
were complete. Langer, European Alliances, p. 15.
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In January 1872, Bismarck selected Adalbert Falk as the new 
minister of public worship,74 anointing him the juridical mas-
termind of the Kulturkampf.* Falk’s first action at his post was to 
draft the School Inspection Law. Inspiring fierce debate through-
out Germany and excited interest in Britain, the law secularized 
German schools, removing Catholic and Protestant influence from 
public education, and thus angering members of the Center Party 
as well as the Junker Conservatives. British liberals, who tended 
to view Church control over schools as retrogressive, received the 
law with great enthusiasm and were pleased to see Bismarck break 
with the Conservatives in favor of the National Liberals. British 
liberals began to hope that Bismarck was shunning his reactionary 
ways, but British conservatives—still far to the left of the German 
chancellor—remained skeptical.† Odo Russell was well informed 
on Church matters,75 and he followed Bismarck’s anti-clerical cam-
paign with acute interest. “[A]t this moment they can think and 
talk of nothing but the coming war with the Church,” reported 
Russell from Berlin. “Old !ile confided to me that he feared Bis-
marck was overdoing it and exciting popular animosity against the 
Clergy through the press to such a pitch that he would find it dif-
ficult to manage the anticlerical masses he was now arming and 
urging on.”76 But at that point, in late winter 1872, the infant Kul-
turkampf seemed very enlightened indeed to the British political 
classes. Conservatives like Disraeli‡ and Liberals like Gladstone§ 
could agree that the Vatican, which had recently propagated the 
Syllabus of Errors and decreed papal infallibility, represented an im-
pediment to progress.
 As Bismarck’s anti-clerical campaign gained momentum, 
* Bismarck gave Falk straightforward instructions: “To re-establish the rights of the State in 
relation to the Church, and with as little fuss as possible.” Quoted in Eyck, Bismarck, pp. 206–07.
† !e Pall Mall Gazette (London)—one of the more conservative papers in Britain at the 
time—surmised that the Liberals were getting ahead of themselves in their hopes. See 
“Occasional Notes,” !e Pall Mall Gazette (London), February 29, 1872.
‡ Disraeli expressed his hope for Britain to play a “noble part” in the conflict between 
enlightenment and ultramontanism. See Richard Shannon, !e Age of Disraeli, 1868-1881: !e 
Rise of Tory Democracy (London: Longman, 1992), p. 167, p. 200.
§ Gladstone actively opposed the decree of papal infallibility on both religious and political 
grounds. See Josef L. Altholz, “Gladstone and the Vatican Decrees,” !e Historian, Vol. 25, No. 
3 (May 1963), pp. 312–24.
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the French resurgence persisted at a fast pace, and !iers boasted 
of the renewed strength of the French army. Although such incen-
diary language deeply upset German opinion and certainly spread 
fears throughout Europe of another Franco-German conflict, Rus-
sell was convinced that Bismarck’s next war would be an uncon-
ventional one. “!e Generals tell the Emperor it would be better 
to fight France before she is ready than after,” wrote Russell, “but 
Bismarck, who scorns the Generals, advises the Emperor to fight 
France morally through Rome and the Catholic alliances against 
United Germany.”77 !is was exactly Bismarck’s intention. On 
May 14, 1872, the chancellor declared war against the Catholic 
Church in the Reichstag.*
!e Kulturkampf, as the historian Erich Eyck explains, “was 
looked on by a great part of Europe as one of the most exciting 
events of the age … there can be no doubt that in those years 
many of the most enlightened and highly educated men believed 
that the future of mankind was at stake.”78 !e veracity of Eyck’s 
statement is confirmed by the spectacular pronouncements of the 
British press. To illustrate, !e Standard saw in Germany and the 
Vatican the respective embodiments of “Positivism and Ideality, the 
conflicting doctrines which have, for years past … been gradually 
drawing the populations of Europe into two hostile camps; and we 
are thus unable to divest ourselves of the belief that on the issue of 
the struggle now imminent hangs the future mastery over Europe 
of the principles involved in one or the other of these doctrines.” 
77.5 It was the age of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of the Spe-
cies, and the Kulturkampf seemed the physical manifestation of the 
battle of science and progress versus superstition. In this conflict, 
the British political classes firmly supported science and progress; 
they were therefore ecstatic to see Bismarck, the proud Junker, 
split with the Conservatives, side with the National Liberals, and 
pioneer a crusade against clerical obscurantism. Nowhere outside 
of Germany was the Kulturkampf viewed more favorably than in 
Protestant England. In March 1872, !e Times judged Bismarck’s 
* Bismarck famously declared: “Have no fear—to Canossa we shall not go, either in body or in 
spirit.” Quoted in Arlinghaus, “Kulturkampf,” p. 348.
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 efforts against the Catholic Church a “splendid success” and criti-
cized France for lagging behind Germany on this enlightened path: 
“[France] ought at last to feel how little it becomes her to be out-
done by Germany in a just and liberal course.”79
Brimming with confidence, Bismarck unveiled his next major 
initiative in June 1872: a law that dissolved the Society of Jesuits 
in Germany and gave the government the right to banish any Je-
suit from the empire.80 "is policy was clearly shaded in a darker 
hue than those hitherto enacted, and Eduard Lasker—leader of the 
National Liberal Party’s left wing—protested the law, proclaiming 
that it violated his liberal conscience.81 "e British public seized 
upon the Jesuit law even more feverishly than it had the School In-
spection Law, but this time responses were mostly negative. When 
one British newspaper commended the Jesuit law, !e Standard 
lashed back fiercely. “Surely no more fitting motto for the Liber-
als of the present day could be found than these words of Tacitus, 
written nearly two thousand years ago—Omnia liberaliter pro domi-
natione,” harangued !e Standard:
From the representative German Liberal, a petty tyrant in heavy 
chains, one can hardly expect very broad views on the subject of 
personal freedom; but when a London paper … openly justifies 
religious persecution, we may well ask ourselves if all the prog-
ress, all the civilisation of which we boast, is not a dream from 
which we are gradually awakening.82
!e Lancaster Gazette echoed such sentiments, calling the Jesuit 
law “an antiquated policy” and criticizing Bismarck for imagining 
a Jesuit-led conspiracy of Austria, France, and the Vatican against 
Germany.83 "e British Catholic Union organized a mass meet-
ing, presided over by the Duke of Norfolk, to protest the German 
legislation. "e Earl of Denbigh’s resolution condemning the law 
as “a wrong done to all natural right” passed comfortably. Denbigh 
had expected the result: “"e meeting … was bound to carry this 
motion, not only as Catholics, but as Englishmen and as the cham-
pions of liberty and of rights of the subject.”84 It was well for the 
British to find clerical obscurantism distasteful, but they must ut-
terly object to policies granting the state such broad capabilities to 
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oppress civilians.
While the anti-Jesuit law tempered British hopes for an en-
lightened renaissance in Germany—and called into question the 
liberalism of the National Liberal Party—the Foreign Office was 
more concerned about Germany’s diplomatic endeavors of Sep-
tember 1872. For in that month Emperor Wilhelm of Germany, 
Czar Alexander II of Russia, and Emperor Francis Joseph of Aus-
tria convened in Berlin for a meeting of indeterminate purpose.* 
"e British government could not help but observe the imperial 
gathering with suspicion. On the most basic level it evoked dis-
tasteful memories of the Holy Alliance, whose reactionary politics 
and hard-line methods had been viewed with disgust in England. 
More immediately, a restored alliance of the three emperors, an-
chored by an all-powerful Germany, would secure Russia’s western 
flank and free the czar to pursue a more vigorous policy in Cen-
tral Asia—the most important theater of Anglo-Russian competi-
tion. Rumors abounded in Britain that great decisions were being 
made at the meeting; there were speculations about the rebirth of 
the Holy Alliance, and Conservative-leaning newspapers blamed 
Gladstone and the Liberals for letting British influence dimin-
ish on the continent.† "e British government was so disturbed 
that it sent an imperial squadron to greet "iers at Le Havre on 
September 18.‡ Odo Russell had the opportunity to meet with 
the foreign ministers of each of the parties at the conference, and 
they all took pains to assure him that no major political issues had 
been discussed. What was notable, however, was the statement of 
the Russian chancellor, Gorchakov, that he “had no interest in the 
weakness of France; on the contrary, he wished for a strong and 
* "e British public was also concerned. In the lead-up to the meeting, !e Morning Post 
(London) speculated that a new Holy Alliance might be proposed, and that an agreement over 
the Eastern Question might be reached. See “France,” !e Morning Post (London), August 9, 
1872, pg. 5. !e Pall Mall Gazette wondered if the meeting might spell doom for France. See 
!e Pall Mall Gazette (London), August 5, 1872.
† “[W]e confess ourselves shocked at this clear evidence of the tendency in Europe to a new 
Holy Alliance…and we shall regret as we have never done before the wane of British influence 
on the Continent.” “Occasional Notes,” !e Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 12, 1872.
‡ "e gesture surprised the French president, but he gladly accepted it. Langer, European 
Alliances, p. 23.
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prudent France,” and Russell’s own shrewd impression that Czar 
Alexander’s participation had been “unexpected and self-invited.”85 
!e mysterious meeting of the three emperors further sub-
dued British hopes that Bismarckian Germany was taking a liberal 
turn. To make matters worse, the expansion of the Kulturkampf 
was apparently backfiring. Traditionally the German Catholics had 
been the most liberal and independent-minded of Europe. Most 
German bishops had opposed the dogma of papal infallibility at 
the Vatican Council, and the British press could praise the German 
Catholics for being less rigid than “the stolid devotees of Italy or 
Spain.”* But the sinister spirit of the Kulturkampf, revealed most 
blatantly in the anti-Jesuit law, pushed them into solidarity with the 
Vatican. Odo Russell, who normally trusted the chancellor’s wis-
dom, was disappointed. “I fancy that Bismarck utterly misunder-
stands and underrates the power of the Church. !inking himself 
far more infallible than the Pope he cannot tolerate two Infallibles 
in Europe,” declared Russell:
!e German Bishops who were politically powerless in Ger-
many and theologically in opposition to the Pope in Rome—
have now become powerful political party Leaders in Germany 
and enthusiastic defenders of the new infallible Faith in Rome, 
united, disciplined and thirsting for martyrdom, thanks to Bis-
marck’s uncalled for and illiberal declaration of War on the free-
dom they had hitherto so peacefully enjoyed.86
Yet while the British were questioning the prudence of Germany’s 
anti-clericalist measures, Bismarck was preparing to intensify them.
!e Kulturkampf reached its highest stage with the infamous 
Falk Laws, first introduced in November 1872 and signed into law 
in May 1873.† !e British press criticized the legislation from the 
first. Morier, then British chargé d’affaires at Munich, knew that his 
* Owing to the liberalism of both Catholicism and Protestantism in Germany, "e Lancaster 
Gazette voiced surprise that such a vicious religious conflict could take place in the country. 
See “!e Jesuits,” "e Lancaster Gazette, and General Advertiser for Lancashire, Westmorland, 
Yorkshire, etc. (Lancaster, England), July 20, 1872, pg. 2.
† By transferring the education, training, and administration of the German Catholic clergy 
into the hands of the state, the Falk Laws effectively granted the German government limitless 
intervention in all aspects of Catholic life. German Catholics, of course, could never accept such 
measures; the bishops staged protests, urged passive resistance, and formally declared their 
resolve to disobey the Falk Laws. Arlinghaus, “Kulturkampf,” p. 350.
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liberal-minded countrymen would resent the legislation, regard-
less of their opinions on the Vatican. “[T]his programme must ap-
pear monstrous to English eyes as an infringement of the plainest 
principles of individual liberty,” wrote Morier in January 1873.87 
Odo Russell’s frustrations multiplied, and he decried the German 
government’s “ignorance.”88 Meanwhile, with the signing of a new 
Anglo–French commercial treaty, and Germany moving closer to 
Russia in consequence, British worries about Bismarck’s intentions 
swelled.* 
In March 1873, Odo Russell deduced that the chancellor had 
two prime objectives: “!e supremacy of Germany in Europe and 
of the German race in the world,” and “!e neutralization of the 
influence and power of the Latin race in France and elsewhere.”89 
Bismarck’s resolve in this mission, Russell concluded, was unbreak-
able: “To obtain these objects he will go to any lengths while he 
lives, so that we must be prepared for surprises in the future.”90 
And perhaps most disturbing, Europe’s day of reckoning might not 
be far distant. “!e Germans … look upon the war of revenge as 
unavoidable and are making immense preparations for it,” Russell 
continued. “Germany is in reality a great camp ready to break up 
for any war at a week’s notice with a million of men.”91 A year after 
the British political classes loudly cheered Bismarck and the School 
Inspection Law, the Foreign Office deemed the chancellor illiberal, 
untrustworthy, and possibly even dangerous.
Despite fears of increasing Anglo-French amity, the German 
government was remarkably out of touch with the apprehension its 
policies had elicited in England. Emperor Wilhelm even thanked 
the British government for being “an ally in the war he was unhap-
pily obliged to carry on against the Roman Catholic Bishops.”92 
Odo Russell, who had received this message at Wilhelm’s seventy-
sixth birthday party, felt obligated to rectify the emperor’s miscon-
ception: “I explained the difference of the standpoint of Church 
and state in England and Germany to His Majesty and said that 
* “We are out of favour with the Germans for preferring the old French alliance to a new 
German one, as our commercial policy is said to prove,” wrote Odo Russell on March 14, 1873. 
Odo Russell to Lyons (March 14, 1873). !omas W. Newton, Lord Lyons: A Record of British 
Diplomacy, Vol. II (New YOrk: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), pp. 41–42.
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the love of freedom and toleration were so great with us now that 
we were not likely to imitate the policy so popular with the liber-
als of Germany at the present moment of placing the clergy and 
all denominations under military discipline.”93 Bismarck, however, 
recognized that the Kulturkampf was faltering, and when Mar-
shal MacMahon, an ultramontane monarchist, replaced !iers as 
French president on May 24, he was hurled into a tailspin. Ampli-
fying the chancellor’s alarm was the fact that, miraculously, France 
was merely months away from having repaid the full five-milliard 
war indemnity, which would necessitate German evacuation of 
French soil. With the onset of summer, Bismarck acutely felt the 
fragility of his position and was determined to repair it.
Lacking faith in Gladstonian England, the chancellor turned 
once again to Prussia’s erstwhile conservative partners, Russia and 
Austria. He realized ready success. Before the end of June, Ger-
many had consummated a military partnership with Russia* and 
entered a loose political alliance with Austria and Russia, bringing 
the !ree Emperors’ League into existence.94 As Bismarck labored 
to shore up Germany’s position vis-à-vis France, the chancellor’s 
worst fears of a Franco-clericalist conspiracy seemed to be coming 
to fruition. Later that summer, the rival royal factions of France 
agreed to a restoration of the monarchy under the Bourbon Count 
de Chambord, whose ultramontane sympathies were well known 
even in England.95 MacMahon was complicit in the arrangement, 
and Pope Pius IX himself had helped negotiate the compromise. 
But much to Bismarck’s relief, Chambord nixed the plan at the last 
moment by refusing to accept the French tricolore over the Bour-
bon white flag. Around the same time, the Bishop of Nancy issued 
a letter to his clergy instructing them to pray for the restitution 
of Alsace-Lorraine to France.† !ese blatant demonstrations of 
Catholic influence in French politics haunted Bismarck; and when 
* !e Russo-German St. Petersburg Convention elicited a strong response from the British 
press, which tended to fear Russian designs. See “!e Meeting of the Emperors at St. 
Petersburg,” !e Huddersfield Daily Chronicle (West Yorkshire, England), May 30, 1873, pg. 4.
† !e Bishop of Nancy’s diocese still included part of German Lorraine. !e affair caught 
the attention of the British press. !e Graphic (London) reported that a German tribunal at 
Saverne had sentenced the Bishop of Nancy in absentia to three months in prison. “Foreign—
France,” !e Graphic (London), May 2, 1874.
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France’s final indemnity payment forced Germany to evacuate 
French territory in September,96 the chancellor was spurred into 
action. Bismarck wrote a letter to the French foreign minister in-
sisting that his government denounce the Bishop of Nancy’s in-
structions and assure that similar episodes would not happen in 
the future.97 Despite half-hearted conciliatory gestures on the part 
of France, the Bishop of Nancy remained steadfast, and the Ger-
man press churned out belligerent pieces against France and the 
Catholic Church.98
By fall 1873, even so consistent a Germanophile as Queen 
Victoria began suspecting that the means Bismarck had used to ef-
fect unification had poisoned Germany in its nursery.99 !e Crown 
Prince Frederick himself had concerns, though he did not want 
his mother-in-law to feel overly discouraged. “!e Entwickelung of 
Germany has not taken place in the way I fondly hoped it would, 
and there are many measures which I cannot admire or approve of,” 
wrote the Crown Prince to Queen Victoria, “but I firmly believe 
that what has been done, has been done for the good of Germany, 
and of Europe.”100 In the Reichstag elections of January 1874, the 
Center Party made substantial gains, becoming the second largest 
party in parliament.101 Not one to concede defeat, Bismarck am-
plified his rhetoric. In a conversation with Gontaut-Biron, French 
ambassador to Germany, the chancellor assumed a fearsome tone. 
“In the conflict in which I’m engaged with the Catholic Church,” 
said Bismarck, “I am energetically determined to conquer … Take 
care lest the [French] masses become fanaticized in the name of the 
persecuted Catholic religion, for then the clerical party will seize 
control and will espouse all the quarrels of the Roman Curia, and 
you will inevitably be drawn into war against us.”102
Bismarck’s threatening language was taken seriously in France, 
and the new French foreign minister, the Duc de Decazes, wast-
ed no time communicating his government’s distress to Britain.* 
* Lord Lyons’ report on the situation vividly illustrates France’s gloom and Britain’s concern: 
“!e fall of France has never, I think, been brought so forcibly home to me, as when I listened 
yesterday to the humble deprecation which Decazes was obliged to make with regard to 
Bismarck’s threats, in the same room in which I had so often heard the high language with 
which the Imperial Minister used to speak of the affairs of Europe. One can only hope that 
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Doubtless disturbed by Bismarck’s foreboding gestures, the British 
Foreign Office solicited the help of Queen Victoria, who agreed to 
appeal to Emperor Wilhelm for Franco-German peace.103 “Not-
withstanding an active and restless Catholic minority, the Eng-
lish nation, as a whole, is essentially Protestant,” the Queen wrote 
to Wilhelm, “and its sympathies would be entirely with Germany 
in any difference with France, unless there was an appearance of a 
disposition on the part of Germany to avail herself of her greatly 
superior force to crush and annihilate a beaten foe, and thus to en-
gender the belief that a strong and united Germany was not, after 
all, the expected mainstay of European peace.” She concluded with 
an exhortation: “Being sensible that the fate of Europe rests in your 
hands, after such unparalleled successes, I venture to express my 
hope that you have the power—and no doubt—also the will to be 
magnanimous.”104
Odo Russell found Bismarck’s maneuvers so confounding 
that he was convinced the chancellor was engaging in deception. 
“[N]othing can save them [the French] if Bismarck is determined 
to fight them again; but then, is it France or is it Austria he is pre-
paring to annihilate?” pondered Russell. Believing that Bismarck’s 
ultimate object was “to mediatize the minor States of Germany and 
to annex the German Provinces of Austria,” Russell deduced that 
the Kulturkampf was a tool of the chancellor’s strategy: “His anti-
Roman policy will serve him to pick a quarrel with any Power he 
pleases by declaring that he has discovered an anti-German con-
spiracy among the clergy of the country he wishes to fight.” #is 
unconventional analysis probably sprouted from the absurdity that 
Russell saw in Bismarck’s perceptible policy, which held that France 
was liable to being attacked lest “[she] gag her press, imprison her 
bishops, quarrel with Rome, refrain from making an army or from 
seeking alliances with other Powers all out of deference to Ger-
many.”105
Odo may be right in thinking that Bismarck’s menaces may subside, when he has carried his 
Army Bill at home. But may not his eagerness in his contest with the Ultramontanes continue 
and carry him on to language and even to measures against France from which it may be 
difficult for him to draw back?” Lyons to Granville ( January 17, 1874). Newton, Lord Lyons, 
vol. 2, p. 50.
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In the opening months of 1874, Bismarck’s bewildering poli-
cies left Britain disconcerted. But the British government could not 
agree on what Bismarck’s aims actually were, and those officials 
who had theories could hardly feel confident in their correctness. 
One thing alone seemed clear: the question of European peace rest-
ed in the hands of the German chancellor. As Odo Russell mused 
darkly: “[T]he only course Governments can follow is to let him 
do as he pleases and submit to the consequences until he dies.”106
THE “WAR-IN-SIGHT” CRISIS AND THE RETURN OF THE 
BALANCE OF POWER
Bismarck never liked Gladstone. Considering the British 
prime minister sanctimonious and timid, Bismarck disparagingly 
referred to him as “Professor Gladstone,”107 and allegedly said that 
during the Grand Old Man’s ministry, he had “lost five years of his 
political life by the foolish belief that England was still a great pow-
er.”108 It thus seemed propitious that in the current state of tension, 
Disraeli, who cared deeply for foreign affairs, replaced Gladstone as 
prime minister in February 1874.* “#e very phrase ‘foreign affairs’ 
makes an Englishman convinced that I am about to treat of sub-
jects with which he has no concern,” said Disraeli on the campaign 
trail, “Unhappily the relations of England with the rest of the world, 
which are ‘foreign affairs,’ are the matters which most influence the 
lot.”109 For Disraeli, foreign policy was the crux of the matter—the 
foundation on which all domestic issues depended. He affirmed 
that the perceived diminution of British power was but an illusion 
produced by the ineffectual Gladstone Ministry: “I express here my 
confident conviction that there never was a moment in our history 
when the power of England was so great and her resources so vast 
and inexhaustible.”110 Disraeli was committed to restoring British 
prestige on the continent, and naturally he first looked to Berlin. 
* It was only the second time since 1832 that the Conservative Party won a general election. 
Jonathan Parry argues (pp. 276–332) that public perceptions of the Gladstone Ministry’s 
weakness, born during the Franco–Prussian War, played a significant part in bringing about 
the electoral results. See: Jonathan Parry, !e Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National 
Identity and Europe, 1830-1886 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 276-77.
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Shortly after assuming office, Disraeli’s foreign secretary, Lord Der-
by, reached out to the German ambassador, Count Münster, and 
voiced high hopes for Anglo-German partnership.*
 Bismarck’s policy, however, manifested no discernible 
changes. In May 1874 the National Liberals extended the Kul-
turkampf even further.† On July 13, 1874, Bismarck’s campaign 
against the Vatican nearly cost him his life when a Catholic cop-
per’s apprentice, Eduard Kullman, fired a bullet into his hand. Un-
surprisingly, Bismarck used the incident to support his accusation 
that the Center Party was an enemy of the German Empire, saying 
to a Center Party deputy in the Reichstag: “You may thrust Kull-
man aside, but he nevertheless belongs to you.”111 "e British press 
widely condemned Bismarck’s cynical use of the incident. “In this 
speech of Prince Bismarck’s,” declared the Pall Mall Gazette, “there 
is a degree of recklessness, an ostentatious refusal or an inability to 
be bound by any of the ordinary rules of human prudence.”112 Just 
when there seemed to be an opening for Anglo-German partner-
ship, Bismarck alienated the British with his fitful outbursts.  
As Bismarck’s policy seemed as aggressive as ever, the French 
vigorously lobbied the Disraeli Ministry to see the danger Germa-
ny posed to European security. Gavard, the French chargé d’affaires 
in London, implored Derby to consider the growing power of the 
German navy, which had added three ironclads since 1871.‡ While 
this information caught Derby’s attention, it was not enough to 
convince the British Foreign Office to adopt the French perspec-
tive.
In December 1874, a Belgian boilermaker named Duchesne 
* On February 28, 1874, Disraeli told Münster that he “had never believed even in Napoleon 
III’s lifetime that France was, or ever could be, a sincere ally of England. "e only people who 
could go hand in hand, as must ever appear more plainly, were Germany and England.” Quoted 
in Winifred Taffs, “"e War Scare of 1875 (I),” !e Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 9, 
no. 26 (December 1930), p. 341.
† "e Reichstag passed a law that permitted the German government to arrest, banish, or 
deprive citizenship from any priest who had been removed under the 1873 Falk Laws. Shortly 
thereafter, all Prussian sees were vacant, and 1,400 parishes were without vicars. Arlinghaus, 
“Kulturkampf,” p. 366; Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), p. 63. 
‡ "ese ironclads were much too heavy to use for just the protection of commercial vessels. 
Langer, European Alliances, p. 42.
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sent a letter to the Archbishop of Paris offering to assassinate Bis-
marck for sixty thousand francs. Obtained and published by the 
German press, the letter caused a stir in both Berlin and London, 
and Bismarck responded by dispatching a note to Belgium urg-
ing the revision of Belgian law to prevent such violent threats in 
the future.* At about the same time Bismarck sent Joseph von 
Radowitz, chief of Germany’s department for Eastern affairs, on 
a special mission to St. Petersburg.113 "e assignment of such a 
high-ranking German diplomat to the Russian capital for no per-
ceptible reason elicited gloomy speculations throughout Europe; 
and one of the most popular was that Radowitz had been sent to 
offer the czar support for his eastern ambitions in exchange for a 
free hand against France.† Less than a year after Disraeli entered of-
fice, Britain’s estrangement from Bismarckian Germany was nearly 
complete. "e chancellor now worried the British not only with his 
words, but also with his actions; Bismarck’s note to Belgium and 
Radowitz’s mysterious mission to St. Petersburg seemed to threat-
en Britain’s vital interests in Belgian neutrality and the preservation 
of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, recognizing Britain’s misgiv-
ings and fearing Bismarck’s ominous designs on his own country, 
Decazes resolved to rally London against German aggression.‡
Franco-German tensions evolved into a full-blown crisis 
on March 13, when the French passed the Cadre Law, adding a 
fourth battalion to each regiment of the French army.114 Both the 
German military establishment and the press were thrown into 
* "e British public followed the Duchesne affair closely. Belgium, of course, remained the 
central zone of British interests on the continent. See “Plot Against Bismarck’s Life,” !e Star 
(Saint Peter Fort, England), December 29, 1874, and “Prince Bismarck,” !e Times, December 
23, 1874, pg. 5, col. A. Fearful rumors about the contents of Bismarck’s note to Belgium also 
circulated the British press. See “Germany and Belgium,” !e Times, April 22, 1875, pg. 5, col. 
G. 
† In his memoirs, Bismarck states that he sent Radowitz to St. Petersburg because Gorchakov, 
the Russian chancellor, refused to allow his diplomats to communicate with Bismarck in Berlin, 
and instead managed Russo-German relations solely through the German diplomatic corps in 
St. Petersburg. Bismarck, Bismarck, vol. 2, p. 190.
‡ Decazes and the French government found the German government’s embargo on the 
exportation of horses (March 2, 1875) particularly troubling. Apparently, the German 
government enacted the embargo after receiving reports that the France government had placed 
orders for 10,000 horses from Germany. E.T.S. Dugdale, ed., German Diplomatic Documents, 
1871-1914, Vol. 1: Bismarck’s Relations with England, 1871-1890 (London: Methuen & Co., 
1928), p. 2.
40 *MWLQER,MWXSV]EW2IQIWMW
frenzy. Moltke calculated that the law would add 144,000 men to 
the French forces, and the newspaper Nationalzeitung described it 
as an “ad hoc” measure that could only have an immediate, aggres-
sive purpose.115 Although German scaremongering strengthened 
Decazes’ case, the British government was not convinced that a 
Franco-German war was imminent. “I do not know and cannot 
conjecture the cause of Decazes’ anxiety,” wrote Derby, “Nothing 
has passed or is passing in any part of Europe to justify alarm as 
to an early disturbance of the peace.”116 At this stage of the crisis, 
Britain was only concerned about Bismarck’s intensions vis-à-vis 
Belgium and the Eastern question; the idea that Germany might 
invade France was considered too outlandish to take seriously.117
!en, in early April 1875, a series of incendiary German 
newspaper articles finally prickled British nerves. Reaching its cli-
max with the infamous Berlin Post article of April 8—provocatively 
titled “Is war in sight?”—the press campaign was universally be-
lieved to be Bismarck’s doing.118 !at the German chancellor was 
commissioning articles affirming the imminence of war could not 
but stir Britain and indeed all of Europe. With the exception of Odo 
Russell, even the foreign diplomats in Berlin were convinced that 
war was looming.119 And despite Russell’s assurances that “Bis-
marck is at his old tricks again” and “this crisis will blow over like 
so many others,” Derby, unaccustomed to the chancellor’s methods, 
seems to have lost faith in Bismarck’s intentions.120 “!e disturbing 
leading article in the Post had become known here that morning,” 
reported Count Münster to Bismarck from London, “and I found 
the Minister [Derby], usually so calm, in a somewhat excited state 
of mind. He said that it almost seemed as though the fears in Paris 
of an attack by Germany were not altogether unfounded.”121
After dinner at the British embassy in Berlin on April 21, 
Radowitz—back from his mission to Russia—engaged in spirited 
conversation with the French ambassador, Gontaut-Biron. !ough 
at present, Radowitz said, Germans were confident that war was 
not imminent, there was certainly cause for anxiety.122 Had Ra-
dowitz ended the discussion then, nothing would have come of it, 
but he proceeded. “[I]f revenge is the inmost thought of France—
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and it cannot be otherwise—,” said Radowitz, “why wait to attack 
her until she has recovered her strength and contracted her alli-
ances? You must agree that from a political, from a philosophi-
cal, even from a Christian point of view, these deductions are well 
grounded and these preoccupations are fitted to guide the policy 
of Germany.”123 What Radowitz was espousing was the theory of 
preventive war, which had been discussed in military circles and 
received with trepidation in France, but never thought to be the 
accepted doctrine of the German government. Yet now a high-level 
German diplomat had mentioned it, and Gontaut believed it was 
uttered as official policy. He quickly transcribed the conversation 
and sent it to Decazes.
Now possessing what he considered definitive evidence that 
Germany was eyeing war, Decazes commissioned M. de Blowitz, 
Paris correspondent for !e Times, to “expose the entire situa-
tion.”124 He also forwarded Gontaut’s report to all the other Euro-
pean capitals.125 Perhaps it was upon learning of Radowitz’s state-
ments that Odo Russell also began doubting Bismarck’s intentions. 
“"e prospect of another war fills me with horror and disgust, and 
if Bismarck lives a few years longer I do not see how it can be pre-
vented,” wrote Russell in late April.126 His concerns were further 
heightened on May 1 when Baron Nothomb, the Belgian ambassa-
dor to Germany, informed him of recent conversations with Moltke 
and Bismarck. Moltke had said that war was inevitable within one 
year unless France revoked the Cadre Law, and Bismarck had spo-
ken even more disturbingly: “Tell your King to get his army ready 
for defence, because Belgium may be invaded by France sooner 
than we expect.” As for Nothomb, his personal fear was that the 
German army might occupy Belgium.127 Russell had been slow to 
believe that Germany might actually be planning for war, but by 
May 1875 the preponderance of evidence was impossible to ignore.
With apprehensions mounting, the British government 
moved to weigh options for curbing Germany’s schemes. "e first 
inclination was to hope that another European power would inter-
vene. “Is there no hope of Russian interference to maintain peace?” 
asked Derby, “It cannot be the interest of Russia to have France 
42 *MWLQER,MWXSV]EW2IQIWMW
destroyed and Germany omnipotent.”128 Interestingly, it seems 
to have been Queen Victoria who first seriously suggested taking 
direct action to ensure peace. On May 5 she told Disraeli that “ev-
ery means should be used to prevent such a monstrous iniquity 
as a war,”129 and proposed that Britain “ought, in concert with the 
other Powers, to hold the strongest language to both Powers, de-
claring they must not fight, for that Europe would not stand another 
war!”130 !e next day Odo Russell happily reported that Count 
Shuvalov, Russian ambassador to Britain, had spent the night in 
Berlin and had informed him that the czar planned to visit the Ger-
man capital on May 10, upon which he would “insist on the main-
tenance of peace in Europe, even at the cost of rupture with Ger-
many.”131 Disraeli recognized an opportunity to reassert Britain’s 
influence in European affairs and expunge the Gladstone Minis-
try’s legacy of diffidence. He communicated his thoughts to Derby 
on May 6: “My own impression is that we [should] construct some 
concerted movement to preserve the peace of Europe, like Pam did 
when he baffled France and expelled the Egyptians from Syria.”132 
!at same day Blowitz’s article appeared in !e Times under the 
title “A French Scare.”133 !e stage for intervention was set.
On May 8, Derby telegraphed Odo Russell instructing him 
to act alongside Alexander II for the preservation of peace in Ber-
lin.134 Meanwhile Count Shuvalov returned to London, where he 
promised British diplomats that Russian expansion into Central 
Asia would cease. While this guarantee did not materially affect 
the course of events, it was remarkable in and of itself: the present 
threat of Germany was considered so severe that Russia and Brit-
ain were willing to shelve their Great Game competition in Asia 
to check it. May 10 was the day of decision. Odo Russell and Bis-
marck ate dinner together, and the British ambassador politely de-
livered his government’s démarche. Bismarck, who was very fond of 
Russell, responded gracefully and even expressed appreciation for 
Britain’s concern for peace.135 But toward the end of the evening, 
Gorchakov, the Russian chancellor, barged into the dining room 
and expressed his own government’s policy with distinctly less tact. 
To make matters worse, he revealed that Britain and Russia had 
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coordinated the intercession. Bismarck was infuriated by Gorcha-
kov, whose pretensions of playing the peacemaker he called a “circus 
performance.” Nevertheless, peace was secured, and Bismarck’s ani-
mosity fell upon Gorchakov alone.
!e British government was pleased with its performance. 
Disraeli fancied that the intervention was the most vigorous act of 
British foreign policy since Palmerston’s time,136 and he congratu-
lated Derby for his work: “Your policy seems to be very popular, 
and very successful … We must not be afraid of saying ‘Bo to a 
goose.’”137 Derby agreed that the policy was wise, not least because 
it “involved no risk and cost no trouble, while it has given us the ap-
pearance of having helped, more than we really did, to bring about 
the result.”138 Meanwhile in Germany, the Crown Prince and his 
wife—who had both been so hopeful for a great liberal partner-
ship between Britain and Germany—were left searching for an-
swers. !e Crown Prince speculated that tensions might have been 
overblown by Bismarck’s indiscrete utterances,139 and the Crown 
Princess complained that the chancellor “remains the sole and om-
nipotent ruler of our destinies.”140 Queen Victoria, whose letters 
to her daughter were typically so gentle, proudly wrote the Crown 
Princess taking credit for Britain’s policy, and providing a harsh 
analysis of Anglo-German relations: “No one wishes more, as you 
know, than I do for England and Germany to go well together; but 
Bismarck is so overbearing, violent, grasping and unprincipled that 
no one can stand it, and all agreed that he was becoming like the 
first Napoleon whom Europe had to join in PUTTING down.”141
!e British had always harbored misgivings about Bismarck. 
Except for a short period in the early stages of the Kulturkampf, 
most Englishmen could probably agree with the German Crown 
Princess’ estimation that Bismarck was “mediaeval” and that “the 
true theories of liberty and of modern government are Hebrew 
to him.”142 Yet despite Bismarck’s obvious power, the British had 
largely refused to let the chancellor color their hopes for an ulti-
mately liberal and peace-loving Germany. As an “enemy of prog-
ress,” Bismarck and his influence would only be temporary. He 
would eventually be swept away by the tide of history, and the Ger-
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man state would then finally reflect the liberal wishes of its people. 
By May 1875, however, Disraeli and his colleagues had recognized 
this reasoning as illusory. Four years to the day from the signing of 
the Treaty of Frankfurt, Britain joined with czarist Russia to coun-
ter an increasingly illiberal Germany. Far from the vision of Mor-
ier’s dreams, “in which free and united Germany, in alliance with 
England, should impose peace on Europe, and inaugurate a golden 
age of international security,”143 by 1875 Bismarck resembled Na-
poleon in the eyes of British statesmen, and Germany seemed more 
likely to disturb the peace than impose it. !e balance of power 
had been restored, but not in the way the British had expected four 
years prior.
FORM AND SUBSTANCE: BRITAIN, BISMARCK, AND THE 
IDEA OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
Not for nothing is history associated with the figure of Nemesis, 
which defeats man by fulfilling his wishes in a different form or by 
answering his prayers too completely. – Henry Kissinger 144
“By defeating Austria and France while unifying Germany 
under Prussia, Bismarck could not help but profoundly challenge 
the European balance of power,” writes David Calleo in "e Ger-
man Problem Reconsidered. “A coalition of hostile powers was nearly 
inevitable, and indeed appeared as early as 1875, when Britain and 
Russia both made clear they would not tolerate another German 
victory over France.”145 !e Anglo-Russian intercession of 1875 
was no small event in the diplomatic history of Europe; after a 
long period of aloofness from European affairs, Britain set aside 
its Central Asian rivalry to counterbalance German power on the 
continent. But to describe the Anglo-Russian action as the work 
of a “coalition of hostile powers” whose emergence was “nearly in-
evitable” after German unification is to overlook the utterances of 
British statesmen made all the way up to 1875.
Far from viewing German unity as an eventuality to be pre-
vented, the British political classes tended to believe that a unified 
Germany would promote European peace and stability. !e British 
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ambassador to Prussia summarized this outlook during the Aus-
tro-Prussian War in 1866:
I could not view with any dissatisfaction or fear of danger to 
England an increase of power to Prussia. She was the great Prot-
estant state of continental Europe. She represented the intelli-
gence, the progress and wealth of Germany. We have … nothing 
to fear from her. She will become a Power of great importance 
in maintaining the peace of Central Europe. She will gradually 
advance in a constitutional system of government, and she will 
play the part of a moderator in Europe. We have much in com-
mon with her—our race, our religion, our mutual interests are 
all interwoven with Prussia, and our political interests should be 
identical.146
British support for German unification rested on two pillars: the 
geopolitical premise that a robust Germany at the center of Eu-
rope would restrain France and Russia from challenging Britain’s 
extra-continental dominance, and the sociocultural premise that a 
unified Germany must be liberal and, in turn, Britain’s “natural ally.” 
British statesmen wanted not only the form of united Germany but 
also a certain substance; their mistake was to assume that the for-
mer would inexorably produce the latter.
Hence it is unsurprising that England received news of Prus-
sia’s victory at Sedan with loud cheers. France, which had caused 
tremendous upheaval on the continent for over two centuries, had 
fallen to Prussia, which was a symbol of restraint and shared im-
portant religious, cultural, and ideological ties with Britain. More-
over, Queen Victoria’s daughter was married to the Crown Prince 
of Prussia, who socialized in liberal circles and wrote passionately 
of “a free German Imperial State, that in the true sense of the word 
should march at the forefront of civilisation and be in a position to 
develop and bring to bear all noble ideals of the modern world.”147 
But Prussia’s behavior in the aftermath of Sedan, including the 
bombardment of Paris and especially the annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine, chafed at British ideas of morality and justice, which were 
particularly important to Prime Minister Gladstone.
Most educated Englishmen of the era—who were all liberal 
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by continental standards—were steeped in the “Whig interpreta-
tion” of history. For these men, history was teleological, unfolding 
ever-higher levels of progress and more perfect forms of liberal 
government. All people were essentially the same; the only differ-
ence between nations was their relative positions on the same path 
to enlightenment. "ere was no room in this paradigm for great 
men. Individuals could either swim with the tide of history or be 
washed away; they certainly could not alter its flow. In his quest for 
German unification, Bismarck swam with the tide, and thus should 
be supported; in his reactionary and aggressive policies, Bismarck 
swam against it, and thus could be ignored. Germany’s troublesome 
behavior between the Battle of Sedan and the signing of the Treaty 
of Frankfurt could be written off to Bismarck, whose influence 
would be ephemeral. By 1871, therefore, Britain’s highest hopes 
were shaken, but its ultimate faith in united Germany remained.
British doubts, however, were amplified in the years 1871–
1874. In its early stages, the Kulturkampf enjoyed popularity in 
England. Secularizing German public schools was considered the 
epitome of progress, and Bismarck’s breaking with the Junker Con-
servatives to combat clerical obscurantism alongside the National 
Liberals seemed cause for celebration. "e confidence of British 
statesmen and intellectuals was momentarily restored. But British 
enthusiasm for the Kulturkampf faded when it lost all semblance of 
proportion; indeed it was impossible for the British liberal mind 
to support policies that enabled the state to imprison Jesuits and 
priests at will. Compounded with Bismarck’s revival of the triple al-
liance of Germany, Russia, and Austria, the increasingly repressive 
nature of the Kulturkampf called into question the very liberalism 
of the National Liberal Party, and the English were forced to re-
evaluate their conviction that a unified Germany would be Britain’s 
ideological ally.
 When the Kulturkampf entered the realm of foreign policy, 
and German officials began making threats to both France and 
Belgium, the fears of British statesmen came fully alive. Perhaps 
Germany would not only be illiberal at home, but also a menace 
to continental stability and possibly even Britain’s vital interests. 
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!is was the worst of both worlds—both geopolitical and socio-
cultural premises were failing; Germany’s disappointing substance 
seemed to reverse all expected benefits of the form of unification. In 
1874 Prime Minister Disraeli entered office preaching the return 
of Britain as a force in international politics, and in May 1875 he 
got his chance. By the time of the Anglo-Russian intercession at 
Berlin on May 10, Bismarck’s tactless press campaign and the bel-
ligerent statements of a variety of German officials had convinced 
virtually the entire British Foreign Office that Germany must be 
restrained. Even Odo Russell, whom Bismarck was sure harbored 
no suspicions of Germany’s intentions vis-à-vis France, applauded 
the decision to intervene.*
!omas Carlyle, one of Britain’s most ardent Germanophiles, 
rejected the “Whig interpretation” of history. “[A]ll things that we 
see standing accomplished in the world,” wrote Carlyle, “are properly 
the outer material result, the practical realisation and embodiment, 
of !oughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world.”148 
By 1875, it was clear that the mere form of German unity would not 
produce the substance so desired by British intellectuals; Bismarck 
was one of Carlyle’s “Great Men,” and the Germany born in 1871 
was unmistakably his offspring. Perhaps the most ironic element of 
the situation is that as far back as 1854 British statesmen had iden-
tified Bismarck with ideas antithetical to English liberalism, and 
some had even speculated that his future rise to power could only 
signify that reactionary forces had triumphed in Prussia.149 Yet 
these same statesmen believed nationalism and liberalism were in-
extricably tethered, and thus they stomached Bismarck’s aggressive 
means in the belief that not even three wars could thwart Germany 
from liberal development. But, as it happened, in uniting Germany 
with “blood and iron,” Bismarck successfully severed nationalism 
* Bismarck was shocked by the British intercession. As he wrote to Münster a few days 
afterward: “!is phenomenon to me is all the more astonishing since Lord Odo Russell has 
always reported from here in a contrary sense. I consider him much too good and truthful an 
observer, considering how long he has had before him evidence of our friendly policy, to have 
written any differently.” Bismarck to Münster (May 14, 1875). Dugdale, German Diplomatic 
Documents, vol. 1, p. 9.; Odo Russell wrote to Derby five days after the intervention: “I was 
delighted at the course pursued by Her Majesty’s Government and at the instructions you sent 
to me, which I feel sure will do good, both at home and abroad.” Odo Russell to Derby (May 
15, 1875). Newton, Lord Lyons, vol. 2, p. 80. 
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from liberalism; and it was not until 1875 that the British finally 
acknowledged his protean influence.
As Franco-German tensions heightened in 1874, Robert 
Morier reflected wistfully on “the irony of fortune which grants to 
men what they earnestly pray for, but usually in such a way as to 
render the gift useless or worse than useless.”150 So eager to see 
Germany unified, and so confident of the inseparability of nation-
alism and liberalism, Morier had grudgingly supported Bismarck’s 
wars. But those wars had consequences beyond German unifica-
tion: notably an enduring Franco-German antagonism, enshrined 
in the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the vindication of mili-
tary force as the critical instrument of German statecraft. British 
statesmen ought not have been surprised, therefore, when German 
officials decided that aggressive threats were the best means to 
make France accommodate their interests in 1875. "e “war-in-
sight” crisis marked the culmination of nineteenth-century Britain’s 
disillusionment with the idea of German unification, and though it 
certainly did not make a future Anglo-German conflict inevitable, 
it revealed for the first time the constellation of powers that would 
clash in the great wars of the twentieth century.
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